Last week, there was an invitation from the government of Ma­harashtra asking me to attend a programme called ‘Mumbai Shapath’, meaning ‘A Pledge for Mumbai’, to commemorate the first anniversary of the terror attacks on Mumbai in November 2008. My blood boiled at the shamelessness of the politicians who were attempting to gloss over their failures during the crisis as well as in the intervening year with this public relations exercise. I was so angry that on the morning of November 26, I vented it by writing a post on social networking site Twitter, “The government of Maharashtra is holding a pr­ogramme at Gateway of India. Mumbaikars should go a­nd pe­lt the shameless VIPs wi­th rotten eggs and old footwear.’

However, if the state politicians were shameless, the on­es at the Centre were no better, as they made a pretext of paying homage to the victims and martyrs by standing in silence for two minutes, after which it was business as usual — shouting at each other and rushing into the well of the Lok Sabha and the Rajya Sabha. What a shame on a day when the rest of the country was grieving.

The failure of the system on November 26, 2008, and the subsequent 60 hours wh­en 10 terrorists laid siege on Mumbai and held its police at bay, ra­ised a lot of questions. However, one felt that at least now the state government and the Centre would act and take measures to ensure that a ha­ndful of people could never ho­ld so many people to ransom. Alas, one year has passed and nothing has changed. Several questions are still unanswered and many shortcomings yet to be addressed.

It was apparent that the po­lice command structure had collapsed in the crucial first few hours of the attack. The questions raised by Vinita Kamte, wife of one of the kil­led IPS officers, Ashok Kam­te, in her recent book remain unanswered. Has a proper ch­ain of command and responsibilities been set in place now? At the moment, it se­ems the blame game is still going on.

How much time and ammunition do the jawans and officers of the Mumbai Police spend on the shooting ranges to practice? Do they have any experience of handling hand grenades and explosives? So­me time ago, there was a report that, on an average, a constable fires five rounds per annum in a firing range and an officer slightly more. Is this enough to make them good marksmen and efficient users of firearms?

Does the Mumbai Police hold urban warfare exercises? Do the constables and officers undergo physical fitness tra­in­ing aimed at engaging in sustained warfare with well-tr­a­ined and equipped terrorists? Are they made aware of various situations, such as ho­st­age taking and dealing with situations, where they would have to enter booby-trapped bu­ildings to fight terrorists and rescue hostages?

The terrorists had sneaked into Mumbai via the sea rou­te. What measures has the go­vernment — state and Centre — taken to safeguard the we­stern seashore? How many surveillance sorties does the Coast Guard fly daily? How many cr­afts and personnel do they deploy to ensure that infiltration is detected and stop­ped? What kind of night surveillan­ce eq­uipment do they ha­ve? Has the Maharahstra go­vernment taken steps to sa­nitise its shoreli­ne? Earlier, too, explosives we­re smuggled in with de­vastating consequ­ences for wh­at was then Bombay.

Had it not been for the gallant action of the National Security Guard (NSG), the crisis would have prolonged with grimmer consequences. Why then has the Mumbai Police asked NSG to pay Rs 1,200 per hour for the use of their firing range at Goregaon? Why has the state governme­nt asked NSG to vacate their camps at Kalina? Why has it offered NSG only 24 acres wh­en they had asked 400 acr­es? The government seems mo­re eager to offer the salt pan lands to bu­ilders, rather than NSG.

On November 26, 2008, after being shot and dumped on the road by the terrorists, senior police officers Hemant Kar­kare, Kamte and Vijay Sal­askar were not provided medical attention for an hour, resulting in their death. Following this tragedy, how many am­bulances has the state government bought in the interven­ing year, equipped with li­fe-saving equipment and ma­n­ned by critical care parame­dics? Has the ambulance fleet attached to government ho­spitals and fire brigade be­en au­gmented or upgraded?

Had it not been for the gallant firemen and their ability to improvise, many more wo­uld ha­ve lost their lives at the Taj and the Trident. The lack of high-powered water cannons that can douse fires in high-rises and of snorkel ladders for efficient evacuation was painfully apparent that day and the subsequent 60 ho­urs. So, has the governme­nt made any pl­ans to modern­ise the fire-fighting and rescue forces? How many fire tenders have been added to the fleet? Have they bought hi­gh-powered water ca­nnons capable of reaching the highest buildings or more sn­orkel la­dders to evacuate tr­apped people?

Unfortunately, the answer to all these questions is a big ‘No’. So, what was the ‘Pledge for Mumbai’ all about? Nothing but a farce.

The writer is founder president, Mahatma Gandhi Foundation