Irrespective of the outcome of the Copenhagen climate conference, it is clear that India will come under growing pressure to take initiatives on climate change mitigation, including voluntary cuts in greenhouse emissions and other measures — preferably even before the summit. That is largely because China has just announced a 40-45 per cent target for reducing the carbon intensity of its GDP by 2020 (over 2005), and Brazil to cut its emissions from deforestation by 33-39 per cent by 2020. The other ‘Plus Five’ fast-growing developing economies have made similar offers.

India, the world’s fourth largest emitter, cannot afford to be seen as a laggard in relation to them. It is not good enough for India to have announced the National Solar Mission, an undoubtedly ambitious plan to install 20,000 MW of photovoltaic generation capacity by 2022; India is expected to do more.

This is partly because the Chinese offer is seen to be larger than it is, and because India is seen as inclined to negative stands and “obstructionism”. If the cut-off date (1990) agreed in the UN climate convention is used, China’s emissions-intensity reduction offer would amount to under 20 per cent. If China’s GDP continues to grow at 9 per cent, and it carries on building one new coal-based power station every 10 days and furiously producing emissions-intensive goods, its emissions will rise by more than 50 per cent over the next 12 years. This does not represent serious climate restraint. But perceptions matter.

And here, India scores badly despite being a low per capita emitter and despite having formulated the national action plan on climate change. The reason is simple. India denies, or takes an agnostic position on, climate-related issues closest to its own location: the melting of the Himalayan glaciers, generation of black carbon (soot and other products of incomplete combustion of biomass, especially in domestic cookstoves), and overexploitation of groundwater.

There is a consensus in the global scientific community led by the UN inter-governmental panel on climate change (and among India’s own climate scientists, barring a small fringe) that the Himalayan glaciers are melting at an unprecedented rate, faster than glaciers elsewhere in the world. The Himalayas are the earth’s “Third Pole”, its largest store of ice and water after the Arctic and the Antarctic. They are the source of seven of Asia’s greatest river systems, including the Ganges, the Indus and the Brahmaputra. The rapid recession of Himalayan glaciers spells disaster for India’s own water security.

The problem is aggravated by black carbon, which accelerates the mountains’ warming by absorbing sunlight. Rather than look for remedies, such as cleaner cookstoves or a switch to liquefied petroleum gas, India’s national mission on the Himalayas has confined itself to an information-generation and research agenda.

Similarly, over-drawal of groundwater from the Indian landmass is causing a rise in sea levels, which is equivalent to the impact of the melting of the Alaskan ice-sheet. This should jolt Indian policy-makers into action, but has failed to do so

This speaks to a larger pathology: India’s climate policy and negotiating stance have evolved in a reactive fashion in small, cloistered circles. The process has excluded independent experts, non-governmental organisations and representatives of the people who are most affected by climate change. Even the high-level prime minister’s council on climate change was cavalierly bypassed when the solar mission plan was revised and announced last fortnight. The policy-making process is driven by paranoid perceptions of the entire climate change agenda as a geopolitical threat and a constraint on India’s GDP growth.

This must change. India has a vital stake in combating climate change—not least because it is highly vulnerable to it thanks to its 7,500 kilometre-long coastline, dependence on monsoon-fed riv-ers and socio-economic factors including widespread poverty and poor infrastructure.

India must embrace the climate mitigation and adaptation agenda as its own priority—and as part of its obligation to its poor majority, which will suffer the most under continuing climate change. There is vast scope for reducing emissions in energy generation, industry, transportation, agriculture, cooking energy, housing and construction; conserving water; promoting renewable energy; and regenerating forests thr-ough people’s involvement in forestry management. India can do all this without compromising on the objective of poverty reduction and providing a civilised standard of living for its half-a-billion-plus poor people.

This calls for a complex approach: globally defending North-South equity in burden-sharing to combat climate change, while domestically promoting climate-responsible, equitable and sustainable development. Can our policy-makers rise to the task?