Progress can also have unethical consequences. We have seen this happ­ening in physical sciences. It is now happening in life scien­ces. Science can be used for good as well as bad purposes. This gives rise to “dual-use dilemma”. The biological techniques, which are used for the betterment of the humans can also be used for their destruction. The same techniques that promote advancement of medicine could also facilitate production of biological weapons of mass destruction.

For example, many of the same methods for developing attenuated live vaccines against viral diseases can have offensive applications as well. The three scariest bioweapons are anthrax, smallpox, and plague because these diseases spread so quickly through a population. According to a document, engineered biological agents could be worse than any disease known to man. We can argue that biological weapons should not be used as they contradict the universal principles of war.

The creation and stockpiling of biological weapons though is outlawed by the 1972’s Biological Weapons Convention and Geneva Protocol, its threat remains. In fact the threat is more than it ever was. We all know that bioweapon manufacturers don’t give a heed to ethical principles.

It is thus futile to imagine that access to dangerous pathogens and destructive biotechnologies can be physically restricted in a world where materials and technologies for biological weapons are easily accessible. It is also a fact that the researchers can’t stop doing something good because it also has bad side.

This duality is creating uncertainties and ethical dilemmas among life scientists. Imagine Louis Pasteur and Robert Koch were not allowed to do research to identify, isolate and culture disease-causing microbes to induce disease in a “native” host because these techniques can also help researchers to produce biological weapons.

The only difference between the two approaches is rationality in the design of experiments; one aims to develop better sanitation and hygiene practices, while the other wants intentional development of disease to be used as a weapon. The key issue is whether the risks associated with misuse can be reduced while still enabling critical research to go forward. Is there a way to minimise the risk of wrongful use of biological techniques?

The “provocative” categories of research for countering bioterrorism, as identified by US’s Nati­onal Institute of Health (NIH) include efforts to identify path­ogen-induced immunoregulatory and immunosuppressive effects as well as to analyse gene expression of agents of bioterrorism.

A report entitled Biotechn­ology Research in an Age of Terrorism prepared by a committee appointed by the US National Academy of Sciences has made certain recommendations, keeping in view the mechanism that “will raise awareness and alarm when needed, without unduly constraining the practice, processes, and products of the life sciences research enterprise”.

The recommendations of the committee included educating the scientific community through professional societies about the nature of dual use dilemma and their responsibilities to mitigate its risks. The committee also suggests establishing a system to review ‘experiments of concern’.

The experiments of concern included the following: experiments that would render a vaccine ineffective, that would confer resistance to therapeutically useful antibiotics, antiviral agents, that would enhance the virulence of a pathogen or render a non-pathogen virulent, that would increase transmissibility of a pathogen, that would alter the host range of a pathogen, that would enable the evasion of diagnostic/detection modalities, that would enable the weaponisation of a biological agent or toxin. The committee recommends self- review of the publications for their potential security risks. In the law enforcement committees, the committee suggests to include life science community.

The writer is a biotechnologist and ED, Birla Institute of Scientific Research, Jaipur